We construct the first Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol whose security does not degrade with an increasing number of users or sessions. We describe a three-message protocol and prove security in an enhanced version of the classical Bellare-Rogaway security model.
Introduction
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols allow two parties to establish a cryptographic key over an insecure channel. Secure AKE protects against strong active attackers that may for instance read, alter, drop, replay, or inject messages, and adaptively corrupt parties to reveal their longterm or session keys. This makes such protocols much stronger (and thus harder to construct) than simpler passively secure key exchange protocols like e.g. [DH76] .
The most prominent example of an AKE protocol is the TLS Handshake [DA99, DR06, DR08], which is widely used for key establishment and authentication on the Internet. The widespread use of TLS makes AKE protocols one of the most widely-used cryptographic primitives. For example, the social network Facebook.com reports 802 million daily active users on average in September 2013. This makes more than 2 29 executions of the TLS Handshake protocol per day only on this single web site. 2 The wide application of AKE protocols makes it necessary and interesting to study their security in large-scale settings with many millions of users.
Provably-secure AKE and tight reductions. A reduction-based security proof describes an algorithm, the reduction, which turns an efficient attacker on the protocol into an efficient algorithm solving an assumed-to-be-hard computational problem. The quality of such a reduction can be measured by its efficiency: the running time and success probability of the reduction running the attacker as a subroutine, relative to the running time and success probability of the attacker alone. Ideally the reduction adds only a minor amount of computation and has about the same success probability as the attacker. In this case the reduction is said to be tight.
The existence of tight security proofs has been studied for many cryptographic primitives, like digital signatures [Ber08, Sch11, KK12] , public-key encryption [BBM00, HJ12a, LJYP14], or identity-based encryption [CW13, BKP14] . However, there is no example of an authenticated key exchange protocol that comes with tight security proof under a standard assumption, not even in the Random Oracle Model [BR93b] .
Known provably secure AKE protocols come with a reduction which loses a factor that depends on the number µ of users and the number of sessions per user. The loss of the reduction ranges typically between 1/(µ · ) (if the reduction has to guess only one party participating in a particular session) and 1/(µ · ) 2 (if the reduction has to guess both parties participating in a particular session). This may become significant in large-scale applications. We also consider tight reductions as theoretically interesting in their own right, because it is challenging to develop new proof strategies that avoid guessing. We will elaborate on the difficulty of constructing tightly secure AKE ini the next paragraph.
The difficulty of Tightly-Secure AKE. There are two main difficulties with proving tight security of an AKE protocol, which we would like to explain with concrete examples.
To illustrate the first, let us think of an AKE protocol where the long-term key pair (pk i , sk i ) is a key pair for a digital signature scheme. Clearly, at some point in the security proof the security of the signature scheme must be used as an argument for the security of the AKE protocol, by giving a reduction from forging a signature to breaking the AKE protocol. Note that the attacker may use the Corrupt-query to learn the long-term secret of all parties, except for communication partner P j of the Test-oracle. The index j might be chosen at random by the attacker.
A standard approach in security proofs for AKE protocols is to let the reduction, which implements the challenger in order to take advantage of the attacker, guess the index j of party P j . The reduction generates all key pairs (pk i , sk i ) with i = j on its own, and thus is able to answer Corrupt-queries to party P i for all i = j. In order to use the security of the signature scheme as an argument, a challenge public-key pk * from the security experiment of the signature scheme is embedded as pk j := pk * .
Note that this strategy works only if the reduction guesses the index i ∈ [ ] correctly, which leads to a loss factor of 1/ in the success probability of the reduction. It is not immediately clear how to avoid this guessing: a reduction that avoids it would be required to be able to reveal all long-term secret key at any time in the security experiment, while simultaneously it needs to use the security of the signature scheme as an argument for the security of the AKE protocol. It turns out that we can resolve this seeming paradox by combining two copies of a signature scheme with a non-interactive proof system in a way somewhat related to the Naor-Yung paradigm [NY90] for public-key encryption.
To explain the second main difficulty, let us consider signed-DH protocol as an example. Let us first sketch this protocol. We stress that we leave out many details for simplicity, to keep the discussion on an intuitive level. In the sequel let G be a cyclic group of order p with generator g. Two parties P i , P j exchange a key as follows.
1. P i chooses x $ ← Z p at random. It computes g x and a digital signature σ i over g x , and sends (g x , σ i ) to P j .
2. If P j receives (g x , σ i ). It verifies σ i , chooses y $ ← Z p at random, computes g y and a digital signature σ j over g y , and sends (g y , σ j ) to P i . Moreover, P j computes the key as K = (g x ) y . 3. If P i receives (g y , σ j ), and σ j is a valid signature, then P i computes the key as K = (g y ) x . The security of this protocol can be proved [CK01] based on the (assumed) security of the signature scheme and the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem, which asks for a given a vector (g, g x , g y , g w ) ∈ G to determine whether w = xy or w is random. However, even though the DDH problem is randomly self-reducible [BBM00] , it seems impossible to avoid guessing at least one oracle participating in the Test-session.
To explain this, consider an attacker in the AKE security model from Section 4.1. Assume that the attacker asks Send(i, s, ( , j)) to an (uncorrupted) oracle π s i . According to the protocol specification, the oracle has to respond with (g x , σ i ). At some point in the security proof the security of the protocol is reduced to the hardness of the DDH problem, thus, the challenger of the AKE security experiment has to decide whether it embeds (a part of) the given DDH-instance in g x . Essentially, there are two options:
• The challenger decides that it embeds (a part of) the given DDH-instance in g x . In this case, there exists an attacker which makes the simulation fail (with probability 1) if oracle π s i does not participate in the Test-session. This attacker proceeds as follows.
1. It corrupts some unrelated party P j to learn sk j . 2. It computes g y for y $ ← Z p along with a signature σ j under sk j , and asks Send(i, s, (g y , σ j )) to send (g y , σ j ) to π s i . 3. Finally it asks Reveal(i, s) to learn the session key k s i computed by π s i , and checks whether k s i = (g x ) y . A challenger interacting with this attacker faces the problem that it needs to be able to compute k s i = (g y ) x , knowing neither x or y. Note that the challenger can not answer with an incorrect k s i , because the attacker knows y and thus is able check whether k s i is computed correctly.
• The challenger decides that it does not embed (a part of) the given DDH-instance in g x .
If now the attacker asks Test(i, s), then the challenger is not able to take advantage of the attacker, because the DDH-challenge is not embedded in the Test-session. The only way we see to circumvent this technical issue is to let the challenger guess in advance (at least) one oracle that participates in the Test-session, which however leads to a loss of 1/(µ ) in the reduction.
The challenge with describing a tightly-secure AKE protocol is therefore to come up with a proof strategy that that avoids guessing. This requires to apply a strategy where essentially an instance of a hard computational problem is embedded into any protocol session, while at the same time the AKE-challenger is always able to compute the same keys as the attacker.
Our contribution. We construct the first AKE protocols whose security does not degrade in the number of users and instances. Following [BR93a] we consider a very strong security model, which allows adaptive corruptions of long-term secrets, adaptive reveals of session keys, and multiple adaptive Test queries.
Our model provides perfect forward secrecy [BWJM97, Kra05] : the corruption of a long-term secret does not foil the security of previously established session keys. Furthermore, we prevent key-compromise impersonation attacks [BWM98, GBN09] : in our security model, an attacker may introduce maliciously-generated keys. On the other hand, we do not allow reveals of internal states or intermediate results of computations, as considered in the (extended) Canetti-Krawczyk model [CK01, LLM07] . The existence of a tightly secure construction in such a model is an interesting open problem.
While our approach is generic and modular, we give efficient instantiations from standard assumptions (such as the SXDH or DLIN assumptions in pairing-friendly groups). Specifically, we propose an SXDH-based AKE protocol with a communication complexity of only 14 group elements and 4 exponents (plus some bookkeeping information). The security reduction to SXDH loses a factor of κ (the security parameter), but does not depend on the number of users or instances. (Using different building blocks, this reduction loss can even be made constant, however at a significant expense of communication complexity.)
Our approach. At a very high level, our AKE protocol follows a well-known paradigm: we use a public-key encryption scheme to transport shared keys, and a digital signature scheme to authenticate exchanged messages. Besides, we use one-time signature scheme to provide a sessionspecific authentication, and thus to guarantee a technical "matching conversations" property. 3 The combination of these building blocks in itself is fairly standard; the difficulty in our case is to construct suitable buildings blocks that are tightly and adaptively secure.
More specifically, we require, e.g., a signature scheme that is tightly secure in face of adaptive corruptions. Specifically, it should be hard for an adversary A to forge a new signature in the name of any so far uncorrupted party in the system, even though A may corrupt arbitrary other parties adaptively. While regular signature security implies adaptive security in this sense, this involves a (non-tight) guessing argument. In fact, currently, no adaptively tightly secure signature scheme is known: while, e.g., [HJ12a] describe a tightly secure signature scheme, their analysis does not consider adaptive corruptions, and in particular no release whatsoever of signing keys. (The situation is similar for the encryption scheme used for key transport.)
How we construct adaptively secure signatures. Hence, while we cannot directly use existing building blocks, we can use the (non-adaptively) tightly secure signature scheme of [HJ12a] as a basis to construct adaptively and tightly secure components. In a nutshell, our first (less efficient but easier-to-describe) scheme adapts the "double encryption" technique of Naor and Yung [NY90] to the signature setting. A little more concretely, our scheme uses two copies of an underlying signature scheme SIG (that has to be tightly secure, but not necessarily against adaptive corruptions). A public key in our scheme consists of two public keys pk 1 , sk 2 of SIG; however, our secret key consists only of one (randomly chosen) secret key sk b of SIG. Signatures are (non-interactive, witness-indistinguishable) proofs of knowledge of one signature σ i under one sk i .
During the security proof, the simulation will know one valid secret key sk b for each scheme instance. 4 This allows to plausibly reveal secret keys upon corruptions. However, the witnessindistinguishability of the employed proof system will hide which of the two possible keys sk i are known for each user until that user is corrupted. Hence, an adversary A who forges a signature for an uncorrupted user will (with probability about 1/2) forge a signature under a secret key which is unknown to the simulation. Hence, the simulation will lose only about a factor of 2 relative to the success probability of A.
Of course, this requires using a suitable underlying signature scheme and proof system. For instance, the tightly secure (without corruptions) signature scheme from [HJ12a, ADK + 13] and the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system [GS08] will be suitable DLIN-based building blocks.
Efficient adaptively secure signatures. The signature scheme arising from the generic approach above is not overly efficient. Hence, we also construct a very optimized scheme that is not as modularly structured as the scheme above, but has extremely compact ciphertexts (of only 3 group elements). In a nutshell, this compact scheme uses the signature scheme that arises out of the recent almost-tightly secure MAC of [BKP14] as a basis. Instead of Groth-Sahai proofs, we use a more implicit consistency proof reminiscent of hash proof systems. Security can be based on a number of computational assumptions (including SXDH and DLIN), and the security reduction loses a factor of κ (the security parameter), independently of the number of users or generated signatures. We believe that this signature scheme can be of independent interest.
Adaptively secure PKE and AKE schemes. A similar (generic) proof strategy allows to construct adaptively (chosen-plaintext) secure public-key encryption schemes using a variation of the Naor-Yung double encryption strategy [NY90] . (In this case, the simulation will know one out of two possible decryption keys. Furthermore, because we only require chosen-plaintext security, no consistency proof will be necessary.) Combining these tightly and adaptively secure building blocks with the tightly secure one-time signature scheme from [HJ12a] finally enables the construction of a tightly secure AKE protocol. As already sketched, our signature scheme ensures authenticated channels, while our encryption scheme is used to exchange session keys. (However, to achieve perfect forward secrecy -i.e., the secrecy of finished sessions upon corruption -, we generate PKE instances freshly for each new session.)
Notation. The symbol ∅ denotes the empty set. Let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} ⊂ N and let [n] 0 := [n] ∪ {0}. If A is a set, then a $ ← A denotes the action of sampling a uniformly random element from A. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then we denote by a $ ← A that a is output by A using fresh random coins. If an algorithm A has black-box access to an algorithm O, we will write A O .
Digital Signatures in the Multi-User Setting with Corruptions
In this section we define digital signature schemes and their security in the multi-user setting. Our strongest definition will be existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks in the multi-user setting with adaptive corruptions. We show how to construct a signature scheme with tight security proof, based on a combination of a non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge with a signature scheme with weaker security properties.
Basic Definitions
Definition 1. A (one-time) signature scheme SIG consists of four probabilistic algorithms:
The parameter generation algorithm on input a security parameter 1 κ returns public parameters Π, defining the message space M, signature space S, and key space VK × SK.
• SIG.Gen(Π): On input Π the key generation algorithm ouputs a pair (vk, sk) ∈ VK × SK.
• SIG.Sign(sk, m): On input a private key sk and a message m ∈ M, the signing algorithm outputs a signature σ.
• SIG.Vfy(vk, m, σ): On input a verification key vk, a message m, and a purported signature σ, the verification algorithm returns b ∈ {0, 1}.
We note that our security definition below assumes a trusted setup of public parameters (using SIG.Setup). Moreover, throughout the paper, we will assume signature schemes with message space {0, 1} * for simplicity. It is well-known that such a scheme can be constructed from a signature scheme with arbitrary message space M by applying a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → M to the message before signing.
Security Definitions. The standard security notion for signature schemes in the single user setting is existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks, as proposed by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [GMR88] . We consider natural extensions of this notion to the multi-user setting with or without adaptive corruptions.
Consider the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A, which is parametrized by the number of public keys µ.
, where Π are public parameters. Furthermore, the challenger initializes a set S corr to keep track of corrupted keys, and µ sets S 1 , . . . , S µ , to keep track of chosen-message queries. All sets are initially empty. Then it outputs (vk (1) , . . . , vk (µ) ) to A. 2. A may now issue two different types of queries. When A outputs an index i ∈ [µ], then C updates S corr := S corr ∪ {i} and returns sk i . When A outputs a tuple (m, i), then C computes σ := SIG.Sign(sk i , m), adds (m, σ) to S i , and responds with σ. 3. Eventually A outputs a triple (i * , m * , σ * ). Now we can derive various security definitions from this generic experiment. We start with existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks in the multi-user setting with corruptions.
Definition 2. Let A be an algorithm that runs in time t. We say that A (t, , µ)-breaks the MU-EUF-CMA Corr -security of SIG, if in the above game it holds that
Note that both MU-EUF-CMA Corr and MU-EUF-CMA security notions are polynomially equivalent to the standard (single user) EUF-CMA security notion for digital signatures. However, the reduction is not tight.
Finally, we need strong existential unforgeability in the multi-user setting without corruptions for one-time signatures.
Definition 4. Let A be an algorithm that runs in time t. We say that A (t, , µ)-breaks the MU-sEUF-1-CMA-security of SIG, if in the above game it holds that
In this section we give a generic construction of a MU-EUF-CMA Corr -secure signature scheme, based on a MU-EUF-CMA-signature scheme and a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge that allows a tight security proof. The main purpose of this construction is to resolve the "paradox" explained in the introduction.
NIWI Proofs of Knowledge
Let R be a binary relation. If (x, w) ∈ R, then we call x the statement and w the witness. R defines a language L R := {x : ∃w : (x, w) ∈ R}. A non-interactive proof system NIPS = (NIPS.Gen, NIPS.Prove, NIPS.Vfy) for R consists of the following algorithms.
• Algorithm NIPS.Gen takes as input the security parameter and ouputs a common reference string CRS $ ← NIPS.Gen(1 κ ).
• Algorithm NIPS.Prove takes as input the CRS, a statement x and a witness w, and outputs a proof π $ ← NIPS.Prove(CRS, x, w).
• The verification algorithm NIPS.Vfy(CRS, x, π) ∈ {0, 1} takes as input the CRS, a statement x, and a purported proof π. It outputs 1 if the proof is accepted, and 0 otherwise. 
where π 0 $ ← NIPS.Prove(CRS, x, w 0 ) and π 1 $ ← NIPS.Prove(CRS, x, w 1 ). Simulated CRS. There exists an algorithm E 0 , which takes as input κ and outputs a simulated common reference string CRS sim and a trapdoor τ .
Perfect Knowledge Extraction on Simulated CRS. There exists an algorithms E 1 such that for all (CRS sim , τ )
Security Definition for NIWI-PoK. An algorithm (t, CRS )-breaks the security of a NIWI-PoK if it runs in time t and for all κ ∈ N, CRS real
We note that perfect witness indistinguishability is preserved if the algorithm A sees more than one proof. That is, let O q b (x, w 0 , w 1 ) denote an oracle which takes as input (x, w 0 , w 1 ) with (x, w 0 ) ∈ R and (x, w 1 ) ∈ R, and outputs NIPS.Prove(CRS, x, w b ) for random b ∈ {0, 1}. Consider an algorithm A which asks O q b at most q times. We observe the following (see Appendix A for a proof):
Generic Construction
In this section we show how to construct a MU-EUF-CMA Corr -secure (Definition 2) signature scheme SIG MU from an MU-EUF-CMA-secure (Definition 3) scheme SIG and a NIWI-PoK. In the sequel let NIPS = (NIPS.Gen, NIPS.Prove, NIPS.Vfy) denote a NIWI-PoK for relation 
Then it defines a witness w as
where ⊥ is an arbitrary constant (e.g., a fixed element from the signature space). Note that
The signature for message m is σ := π.
• SIG.Vfy MU (vk, m, σ): The verification algorithm parses vk as (vk 0 , vk 1 ) and returns whatever NIPS.Vfy CRS, (vk 0 , vk 1 , m), σ returns. We have t CRS = t + t CRS and t SIG = t + t SIG , where t CRS and t SIG correspond to the respective runtimes required to provide A SIG MU with the simulated experiment as described below.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. The first game is the real game that is played between an attacker A and a challenger C, as described in Section 2.1. We denote by χ i the event that
Game 0. This is the real game that is played between A and C. We set
Game 1. In this game we change the way keys are generated and chosen-message queries are answered by the challenger. When generating a key pair by running SIG.Gen MU , the challenger does not discard sk 1−δ but keeps it. However, corruption queries by the attacker are still answered by responding only with sk δ . Therefore this change is completely oblivious to A.
To explain the second change, recall that a SIG MU -signature in Game 0 consists of a proof π 
Game 2. This game is very similar to the previous game, except that we change the way the CRS is generated. Now, we run (CRS sim , τ ) Game 4. In this game we raise event abort δ (i * ) and abort (and A loses) if A outputs a forgery (i * , m * , σ * ) such that the following holds.
Given (i * , m * , σ * ), the challenger first runs the extractor (s 0 , s 1 )
Then it checks whether SIG.Vfy vk
Recall here that δ (i * ) denotes the random bit chosen by the challenger for the generation of the longterm secret of user i * . If this condition is satisfied, then the game is aborted. Putting it differently, the challenger aborts, if the witness s 1−δ (i * ) is not a valid signature for m * under vk
. Since A is not allowed to corrupt the secret key of user i * , and the adversary sees only proofs which use two valid signatures (s 0 , s 1 ) as witnesses (cf. Game 1), the random bit δ (i * ) is informationtheoretically perfectly hidden from A. Therefore, we have Pr[abort δ (i * ) ] ≤ 1/2 and Given the above claim, we can conclude the proof of Theorem 1. In summary we have ≤ CRS + 2 · SIG ..
Proof of Claim 1. Attacker B SIG simulates the challenger for an adversary A SIG MU in Game 4. We show that any successful forgery that is output by A SIG MU can be used by B SIG to win the SIG security game.
B SIG receives µ public verification keys
, and public parameters Π SIG from the SIG challenger. Next, it samples µ key pairs (vk
.
Note that now each SIG MU -verification key contains one SIG-verification key that A SIG has obtained from its challenger, and one that was generated by B SIG . We note further that, given vk (i) , sk (i) is distributed correctly and may be returned by B SIG when A SIG MU issues a corrupt query (since it is generated by B SIG itself).
Over that B SIG generates a "simulated" CRS for the NIWI-PoK along with a trapdoor by running (CRS sim , τ )
}, Π SIG and CRS. Now, when asked to sign a message m under public key vk (i) , A SIG proceeds as follows. Let δ (i) = 0 without loss of generality. Then it computes σ 1 = SIG.Sign(sk (µ+i) , m). Moreover it requests a signature for public key vk (i) and message m from its SIG-challenger. Let σ 0 be the response. A SIG computes the signature for m using both signatures w = (σ 0 , σ 1 ) as witnesses. Note that this is a perfect simulation of Game 4.
If Game 4 is not aborted, then any valid forgery of A SIG MU can be used by B SIG as a forgery in the SIG security game. The claim follows.
(Somewhat Inefficient) Instantiation From Existing Building Blocks
The generic construction SIG MU above can be instantiated conveniently from existing building blocks:
• Suitable tightly secure MU-EUF-CMA-secure signature schemes can be found in [HJ12b, ADK + 13] (based on the DLIN assumption in pairing-friendly groups).
• Similarly, a suitable tightly MU-sEUF-1-CMA-secure one-time signature scheme is described in [HJ12b, Section 4.2]. Its security is based on the discrete logarithm assumption.
• Finally, a compatible NIWI-PoK is given by Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08] . (In a Groth-Sahai proof system, there exist "hiding" and "binding" CRSs. These correspond to our honestly generated, resp. simulated CRSs.) The security of Groth-Sahai proofs can be based on a number of assumptions, including the DLIN assumption in pairing-friendly groups. When used in our generic construction, this yields a signature scheme whose MU-EUF-CMA Corr security can be tightly (i.e., with a small constant loss) reduced to the DLIN assumption in pairingfriendly groups. However, we note that the resulting scheme is not overly efficient. In particular, the scheme suffers from public keys and signatures that contain a linear -in the security parameter -number of group elements.
Thus, in the next section, we offer an optimized, significantly more efficient MU-EUF-CMA Corrsecure signature scheme.
Efficient and Almost Tightly MU-EUF-CMA
Corr -Secure Signatures
In this section, we present a very efficient signature scheme whose MU-EUF-CMA Corr security can be almost tightly (i.e., with a reduction loss that is linear in the security parameter) reduced to a number of standard assumptions in cyclic groups. In fact, we prove security under any matrix assumption [EHK + 13], which encompasses, e.g., the SXDH, DLIN, and k-Linear assumptions. The following definitions are taken from [BKP14] .
Pairing Groups and Matrix Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Let GGen be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that on input 1 κ returns a description G = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, g 1 , g 2 , e) of asymmetric pairing groups where G 1 , G 2 , G T are cyclic groups of order q for a κ-bit prime q, g 1 and g 2 are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and e : G 1 × G 2 is an efficiently computable (non-degenerated) bilinear map. Define g T := e(g 1 , g 2 ), which is a generator in G T . We use implicit representation of exponents by group elements as introduced in
We will always use this implicit notation of elements in G s , i.e., we let [a] s ∈ G s be an element in G s . Note that under the discrete logarithm assumption in G s it is hard to compute 
We recall the definition of the Matrix Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption [EHK + 13].
Definition 6 (Matrix Distribution). Let k ∈ N. We call D k a matrix distribution if it outputs matrices in Z 
Assumption relative to GGen in group G s if it runs in time at most t and
where the probability is taken over
and the random coins of A.
assumption is the k-Linear assumption, the k-Cascade, the k-Symmetric Cascade, and the Incremental k-Linear Assumption, respectively. All assumptions are generically secure in bilinear groups and form a hierarchy of increasingly weaker assumptions. The distributions are exemplified for k = 2, where a, a 1 , a 2
s can be represented with k group elements; If A is chosen from U k , then [A] s can be represented with (k + 1)k group elements. Hence, SC k -MDDH and IL k -MDDH offer the same security guarantees as k-Linear, while having the advantage of a more compact representation.
The Construction and its Security
Let GGen be a pairing group generator and let D k be a matrix distribution. The new signature scheme SIG C = (SIG.Setup C , SIG.Gen C , SIG.Sign C , SIG.Vfy C ) for message m ∈ {0, 1} is based on a tightly-secure signature scheme from [BKP14] . Whereas [BKP14] obtained their signature scheme from a tightly-secure single-user algebraic MAC, we implicitly construct a tightly-secure multiuser algebraic MAC. More precisely, the signatures consist of the algebraic MAC part (elements The scheme works as follows.
•
, and defines
For a message m = (m 1 , . . . , m ) ∈ {0, 1} , define the following functions
• SIG.Gen C (Π): The key generation algorithm picks a
The signature for message m is σ :
The verification algorithm picks s $ ← Z k q and returns 1 iff the equation
holds, where
Instantiated under the SXDH assumption (i.e., k = 1 and DDH in G 1 and G 2 ) we obtain a signature scheme with |vk| = 1 × G 1 and |σ| = 3 × G 2 . Instantiated under the k-Lin assumption, we obtain a signature scheme with vk| = k × G 1 and |σ| = (2k + 1) × G 2 . In both cases the public parameters contain k 2 group elements.
Theorem 2. For any attacker A that (t, , µ)-breaks the MU-EUF-CMA Corr -security of SIG C , there exists an algorithm B = (B 1 , B 2 ) such that B 1 (t 1 , 1 )-breaks the D k -MDDH assumption in G 1 , and B 2 (t 2 , 2 )-breaks the D k -MDDH assumption in G 2 where < 1 + 2 2 + 2/q. We have t 1 = t + t 1 and t 2 = t + t 2 , where t 1 and t 2 correspond to the respective runtimes required to provide A SIG MU with the simulated experiment as described below.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. The first game is the real MU-EUF-CMA Corr -security game that is played between an attacker A and a challenger C, as described in Section 2.1. We denote by χ i the event that A SIG MU outputs (m * , i * , σ * ) such that SIG.Vfy(vk ( 
Game 0. This is the real game that is played between A and C. We use (vk i ,
to denote the verification/signing key of the i-th user. We have
Game 1.
In this game we change the way the experiment treats the final forgery
for user i * on message m * . The experiment picks s * $ ← Z k q and defines t * = A · s * . Next, it changes verification equation (5) and returns 1 iff equation
holds. By equation (3) and by the definition of c i * = (b i * ||a i * ) · A, equations (5) and (6) Game 3. In this game, we make a change of variables by substituting all Y i,b and b i using the formulas
respectively. The concrete changes are as follows. First, the public parameters Π are computed by picking Z i,b and x i,b at random and then defining Y i,b using (7). Second, the verification keys vk i for user i are computed by picking c i and a i at random and then defining b i using (7). Third, on a signing query (m, i), the values r and u are computed as before, but the value v is computed as
Fourth, the verification query for message m * and user i * is answered by picking h * $ ← Z q and t * $ ← Z k q , defining t * = h * + AA −1 t * and changing equation (6) to
By the substitution formulas for Y i,b and b i and be the definition of h and t * , equations (4) and (8) and equations (6) and (9) are equivalent. Hence, The remaining argument is purely information-theoretic. Note that in Game 4, the value a i * from sk i * only leaks through vk i * via c i * = (b i * ||a i * ) · A. As the uniform t * ∈ span(A) (except with probability 1/q) the value (b i * ||a i * ) · t * from (6) (which is equivalent to (9)) is uniform and independent from A's view. Hence, Pr[χ 4 ] = 2/q.
The following lemma completes the proof of the Theorem. It follows [BKP14, CW13] 
To prove the lemma, we define the following hybrid games H j , 0 ≤ j ≤ that are played with an adversary C. All variables are distributed as in Game 4. For m ∈ {0, 1} * , define m |j as the j-th prefix of m. (By definition, m |0 is the empty string ε.) Let RF i,j : {0, 1} j → Z q be independent random functions. (For concreteness, one may think of RF i,0 (ε) := a i , the MAC secret key sk MAC of the i-th user. In each hybrid H j , we will double the number of secret-keys used in answering the queries until each query uses an independent secret key.) In Hybrid 
Finally, hybrid H j outputs whatever adversary C outputs. Note that Game 3 can be perfectly simulated using the oracles provided by hybrid H 0 . The reduction picks A We make the following claim:
The proof of this claim essentially follows verbatim from Lemma B.3 of [BKP14] . The reduction uses the fact that the D k -MDDH assumption is random self-reducible. There is a multiplicative loss of 2 since the reduction has to guess m * j , the j-th bit of the forgery m * . Fix 0 ≤ j ≤ − 1. Let Q be the maximal number of tagging queries. Adversary B 2 inputs a
Adversary B 2 defines B := A and picks a random bit α which is a guess for m * j , the j-th bit of m * . We assume that this guess is correct, which happens with probability 1/2. For each user i, define the random function RF i,j (·) via
where R i,m |j $ ← Z q . Let π i,j : {0, 1} j → Q be arbitrary injective functions. Next, for i = 1, . . . , ,
A signing query on (i, m) is simulated as follows. We distinguish two cases. Case 1, if m j = α, then pick random r ∈ Z k q and define u = RF i,j−1 (m |j−1 ) + x(m) · r. By (10), the value u has the same distribution in H j−1 and H j . Case 2, if m j = α (i.e., only [x j,m j B] 2 is known, x j,m j not), then pick random r ∈ Z k q , define r := Br +H β and u := RF i,j−1 (m |j−1 )+ l =j x l,m l ·r+x (A r +H β ). Here H β is the β-th column of H and β = π i,j (m |j ). Let H β = A W β + R β , where R β = 0 or R β is uniform. Then r = A (r + W β ) + R β and 
KEMs in the Multi-User Setting with Corruptions
In this section we will describe a generic construction of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) with tight MU-IND-CPA Corr -security proof, based on any public-key encryption scheme with tight security proof in the multi-user setting without corruptions. Encryption schemes with the latter property were described in [BBM00, HJ12a] . In particular, a tight security proof for the DLINbased scheme from [BBS04] is given in [HJ12a] . A similar scheme was generalized to hold under any MDDH-assumption [EHK + 13].
Before we proceed let us first recall public key encryption and key encapsulation mechanisms.
Public-Key Encryption
A PKE scheme consists of four algorithms PKE = (PKE.Setup, PKE.KGen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) with the following syntax:
The algorithm PKE.Setup, on input the security parameter 1 κ , outputs a set, Π, of system parameters. Π determines the message space M, the ciphertext space C, the randomness space R, and the key space PK × SK.
• (sk, pk) $ ← PKE.KGen(Π): This algorithm takes as input Π and outputs a key pair (sk, pk) ∈ SK × PK.
• c $ ← PKE.Enc(pk, m): This probabilistic algorithm takes as input a public key and a message m ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• m = PKE.Dec(sk, c): This deterministic algorithm takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a plaintext m ∈ M or an error symbol, ⊥.
Security. The standard security notions for public key encryption in the multi-user setting (without corruptions) go back to Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [BBM00] . Security is formalized by a game that is played between an attacker A and a challenger C. 
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
Definition 9. A key encapsulation mechanism consists of four probabilistic algorithms:
• Π $ ← KEM.Setup(1 κ ): The algorithm KEM.Setup, on input the security parameter 1 κ , outputs public parameters Π, which determine the session key space K, the ciphertext space C, the randomness space R, and key space SK × PK.
• (sk, pk) $ ← KEM.Gen(Π): This algorithm takes as input parameters Π and outputs a key pair (sk, pk) ∈ SK × PK.
• (K, C) $ ← KEM.Encap(pk) takes as input a public key pk, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C along with a key K ∈ K.
• K = KEM.Decap(sk, C) takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, and outputs a key K ∈ K or an error symbol ⊥.
We require the usual correctness properties.
Multi User Security of KEMs. We extend the standard indistinguishability under chosenplaintext attacks (IND-CPA) security for KEMs to a multi-user setting with µ ≥ 1 public keys and adaptive corruptions of secret keys. We will refer to this new notion as MU-IND-CPA Corr -security. Consider the following game played between a challenger C and an attacker A. ). 3. Finally, the attacker outputs a pair (i, s, b).
Definition 10 (MU-IND-CPA Corr -security). Algorithm A (t, , µ, )-breaks the MU-IND-CPA Corrsecurity of the KEM, if it runs in time at most t and it holds that
It is easy to see that security in the sense of Definition 10 can efficiently be reduced to standard IND-CPA security. However, the reduction incurs a loss of 1/(µ · ). We will describe a KEM with tight security proof.
Generic KEM Construction
Our KEM KEM MU is based on a PKE-scheme PKE = (PKE.Setup, PKE.KGen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec).
It works as follows:
The parameter generation algorithm KEM.Setup MU on input κ runs Π PKE $ ← PKE.Setup(1 κ ). The session key space K is set to M, the message space of PKE that is determined by Π PKE .
• (sk, pk)
The key generation algorithm generates two keys of the PKE scheme by running (sk i , pk i ) $ ← PKE.KGen(Π) for i ∈ {0, 1}. It furthermore flips a random coin δ $ ← {0, 1} and returns (sk, pk) = (sk δ , δ), (pk 0 , pk 1 ) .
• (K, C) $ ← KEM.Encap MU (pk): On input pk = (pk 0 , pk 1 ) the encapsulation algorithm samples a random key K $ ← K, computes two ciphertexts (C 0 , C 1 ) as C i $ ← PKE.Enc(pk i , K) for i ∈ {0, 1}, sets C := (C 0 , C 1 ), and outputs (K, C).
• K ← KEM.Decap MU (sk, C): The decapsulation algorithm parses sk = (sk δ , δ) and C = (C 0 , C 1 ). It computes K ← PKE.Dec(sk δ , C δ ) and returns K.
Theorem 3. For each attacker A KEM that ( kem , t kem , µ, )-breaks the MU-IND-CPA Corr -security of KEM MU there exists an attacker A PKE that ( pke , t pke , µ, )-breaks the MU-IND-CPA-security of PKE with t kem = t pke + t kem and kem ≤ pke . Here t kem is the runtime required to provide A KEM with the simulation described below.
Proof. Proof. Again we proceed in a sequence of games. Let χ i denote the event that A outputs (i, s, b) with b s i = b ∧ (i, s) ∈ S corr in Game i. Game 0. This is the real game that is played between A and C. Thus we have Pr[χ 0 ] = 1/2 + kem Game 1. This game is identical to Game 0, except that now C changes the way how challenge ciphertexts are generated. For the moment let C = (C 0 , C 1 ) denote an arbitrary challenge KEMciphertext, which consists of two PKE-ciphertexts (C 0 , C 1 ). Let K 1 denote the "real" key encapsulated in C and let K 0 be the corresponding independent random key chosen by the challenger. Let sk = (sk δ , δ) be the secret.
Recall that in Game 0, both ciphertexts (C 0 , C 1 ) encrypt the "real" key K 1 . In Game 1 we change this. Now C δ will be an encryption of the "real" key K 1 , while C 1−δ will encrypt the "random" key K 0 . More precisely, the challenge ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 ) is computed as C δ $ ← PKE.Enc(pk δ , K 1 ) and C 1−δ $ ← PKE.Enc(pk 1−δ , K 0 ). Except for this modification, Game 1 proceeds exactly like Game 0. In particular, note that since C still has knowledge of sk δ , C can respond to corruption queries.
Before we prove this claim, let us finish the proof of Theorem 3 Note that since A is not allowed to corrupt pk i * , the choice of δ (i * ) is perfectly hidden from A. . The idea behind the proof is that A PKE defines the KEM-public keys such that each key consists of one PKE-public-key that A PKE generated on its own (which enables A PKE to answer corrupt-queries of A KEM ), and one PKE-public-key that A PKE has received from its challenger (which allows to reduce the KEM-security to the PKE-security).
For clarity let us in the sequel denote with (pk s i,KEM , sk s i,KEM ) key pairs of the KEM, and with (pk s i,PKE , sk s i,PKE ) of the PKE-scheme. Moreover, we denote with C s i,KEM ciphertexts of the KEMscheme, and with C s i,PKE ciphertexts of the PKE-scheme. 
Note that now each KEM public key consists of one PKE public key obtained from the PKEchallenger and one PKE public key generated by A PKE , their order depends on δ.
In the sequel let us assume δ s i = 0, the case δ s i = 1 is analogous. In this section we present a formal security model for authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocols. We follow the approach of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93a] and use oracles to model concurrent and multiple protocol executions within a party and the concept of matching conversations to define partnership between oracles.
Essentially our model is a strenghtened version of the AKE-security model of [JKSS12] , which allows an additional RegisterCorrupt-query. Moreover, we let the adversary issue more than one Test-query, in order to achieve tightness also in this dimension.
Execution Environment. In our security model, we consider µ parties P 1 , . . . , P µ . In order to formalize several sequential and parallel executions of an AKE protocol, each party P i is represented by a set of oracles, {π 1 i , . . . , π i }, where ∈ N is the maximum number of protocol executions per party.
Each oracle π s i has access to the long-term key pair (sk (i) , pk (i) ) of party P i and to the public keys of all other parties. Let K be the session key space. Each oracle π s i maintains a list of internal state variables that are described in the following:
• Pid s i stores the identity of the intended communication partner.
• Ψ s i ∈ {accept, reject} is a boolean variable indicating wether oracle π s i succesfully completed the protocol execution.
• k s i ∈ K is used to store the session key that is computed by π s i .
• Γ s i is a variable that stores all messages sent and received by π s i in the order of appearance. We call Γ s i the transcript. For each oracle π s i these variables are initialized as (Pid Adversarial Model. The attacker A interacts with these oracles through oracle queries. We consider an active attacker that has full control over the communication network, i.e., A can schedule all sessions between the parties, delay, drop, change or replay messages at will and inject own generated messages of its choice. This is modeled by the Send-query defined below.
To model further real world capabilites of A, such as break-ins, we provide further types of queries. The Corrupt-query allows the adversary to compromise the long-term key of a party. The Reveal-query may be used to obtain the session key that was computed in a previous protocol instance. The RegisterCorrupt enables the attacker to register maliciously-generated public keys. Note that we do not require the adversary to know the corresponding secret key. The Test-query does not correspond to a real world capability of A, but it is used to evaluate the advantage of A in breaking the security of the key exchange protocol.
More formally, the attacker may ask the following queries:
• Send(i, s, m): A can use this query to send any message m of its choice to oracle π s i . The oracle will respond according to the protocol specification and depending on its internal state. If m = ( , j) is sent to π s i , then π s i will send the first protocol message to P j . If Send(i, s, m) is the τ -th query asked by A, and oracle π s i sets variable Ψ s i = accept after this query, then we say that π s i has τ -accepted.
• Corrupt(i): This query returns the long-term secret key sk i of party P i .
If the τ -th query of A is Corrupt(P i ), then we call P i τ -corrupted. If Corrupt(P i ) has never been issued by A, then we say that party i is ∞-corrupted.
• RegisterCorrupt(P i , pk (i) ): This query allows A to register a new party P i , i > µ, with public key pk (i) . If the same party P i is already registered (either via RegisterCorrupt-query or i ∈ [µ]), a failure symbol ⊥ is returned to A. Otherwise, P i is registered, the pair (P i , pk (i) ) is distributed to all other parties, and the symbol is returned. Parties registered by this query are called adversarially-controlled. All adversarially-controlled parties are defined to be 0-corrupted. (i, s) is the τ -th query issued by A, we call π s i τ -tested. If Test(i, s) has never been issued by A, then we say that party i is ∞-tested. The attacker may ask many Test-queries to different oracles, but only once to each oracle. Security Definitions. We recall the concept of matching conversations here that was first introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93a] . We adopt the refinement from [JKSS12] .
Recall that Γ s i be the transcript of oracle π s i . By |Γ s i | we denote the number of the messages in Γ s i . Assume that there are two transcripts, Γ s i and Γ t j , where |Γ s i | = w and |Γ t j | = n. We say that Γ s i is a prefix of Γ t j if 0 < w ≤ n and the first w messages in transcripts Γ s i and Γ t j are identical.
Definition 11 (Matching conversations). We say that π s i has a matching conversation to oracle π t j , if • π s i has sent all protocol messages and Γ t j is a prefix of Γ s i , or • π t j has sent all protocol messages and Γ s i = Γ t j .
We say that two oracles, π s i and π t j , have matching conversations if π s i has a matching conversation to process π t j and vice versa.
Definition 12 (Correctness). We say that a two-party AKE protocol, Σ, is correct, if for any two oracles, π s i and π t j , that have matching conversations it holds that Ψ s i = Ψ t j = accept, Pid Security Game. Consider the following game that is played between an adversary, A, and a challenger, C, and that is parametrized by two numbers, µ (the number of honest identities) and (the maximum number of protocol executions per identity).
1. At the beginning of the game, C generates system parameters that are specified by the protocol and µ long-term key pairs (
It passes to A all public keys, pk (1) , . . . , pk (µ) , and the public parameters. 2. Then the adversary may adaptively issue Send, Corrupt, Reveal, RegisterCorrupt and Test queries to C. 3. At the end of the game, A terminates with outputting a tuple (i, s, b ) where π s i is an oracle and b is its guess for b s i . For a given protocol Σ by G Σ (µ, ) we denote the security game that is carried out with parameters µ, as described above and where the oracles implement protocol Σ.
Definition 13 (Freshness). Oracle π s i is said to be τ -fresh if the following requirements satisfied:
• If there is an oracle, π t j , that has matching conversation to π s i , then π t j is ∞-revealed and ∞-tested.
Definition 14 (AKE Security). We say that an attacker (t, µ, , )-breaks the security of a twoparty AKE protocol, Σ, if it runs in time t in the above security game G Σ (µ, ) and it holds that:
1. Let Q denote the event that there exists a τ and a τ -fresh oracle π s i and there is no unique oracle π t j such that π s i and π t j have matching conversations. Then P r[Q] ≥ , or 2. When A returns (i, s, b ) such that Test(π s i ) was As τ -th query and π s i is a τ -fresh oracle that is ∞-revealed throughout the security game then the probability that b equals b s i is upper bounded by Pr[b
Remark 2. We note that, according to Definition 13, a τ -fresh oracle π s i or its partner oracle π t j may be corrupted later on. This allows us to model perfect forward secrecy [CK01] . Strictly speaking, we do not even require a τ -fresh oracle π s i not to beτ -corrupted, whereτ < τ . I.e., π s i may be τ -fresh, even if there exists aτ < τ such that party i isτ -corrupted. This allows us to model key compromise impersonation attacks [JV96] . Since we do not require the adversary to supply a proof of knowledge of a matching secret key when issuing a RegisterCorrupt-query, we model also PKI-related attacks, e.g., PKI-related unknown key share attacks. Such attacks can have serious security effects [BWM99] . We note further that the adversary may issue more than one Test-query throughout the security game and, over that, that it may issue a Reveal-query, Reveal(i, s), even if π s i is tested.
Our Tightly Secure AKE Protocol
Here, we construct an AKE-protocol AKE, which is based on three building blocks: a key encapsulation mechanism, a signature scheme, and a one-time signature scheme. The protocol is a key transport protocol that needs three messages to authenticate both participants and to establish a shared session key between both parties. Informally, the key encapsulation mechanism guarantees that session keys are indistinguishable from random keys. The signature scheme is used to guarantee authentication: The long-term keys of all parties consist of verification keys of the signature scheme. Finally, the one-time signature scheme prevents oracles from accepting without having a (unique) partner oracle.
In the sequel let SIG and OTSIG be signature schemes (Definition 1) and let KEM be a keyencapsulation mechanism (Definition 9). We will assume common parameters Π SIG
Long-term secrets. Each party is in possession of a key pair (vk, sk) $ ← SIG.Gen(Π SIG ) for signature scheme SIG. In the sequel let (vk (i) , sk (i) ) and (vk (j) , sk (j) ) denote the key pairs of parties P i , P j , respectively.
Protocol execution. In order to establish a key, parties P i , P j execute the following protocol (see also Figure 1 in Appendix B).
1. First, P i runs (sk
OTS ). It defines Pid = j and m 1 := (vk
KEM , Pid, i) and transmits m 1 to P j . 2. Upon receiving m 1 , P j parses m 1 as the tuple (vk
KEM , Pid, i). Then it checks whether Pid = j and SIG.Vfy (vk (i) , vk
OTS , σ (i) ) = 1. If at least one of both check is not passed, then P j outputs ⊥ and rejects. Otherwise it runs (vk OTS to P j . Finally, P i computes and outputs the session key K i,j := KEM.Decap(sk
OTS , P j checks whether OTSIG.Vfy(vk
OTS ) = 1. If this fails, then ⊥ is returned. Otherwise P j outputs the session key K i,j := K.
Efficiency Analysis.
Here, we analyze the efficiency of our AKE when implemented with the building blocks described above. The following messages are exchanged for each run of the protocol:
This leads to an overall communication complexity of 2 · (|σ MU-EUF-CMA Corr | + |vk OTS | + |σ OTS |) + |pk KEM | + |C KEM | (plus the size of i and pid). If we use the D k -MDDH-based signature scheme from Section 2.3, then σ MU-EUF-CMA Corr consists of 2k + 1 group elements. (For efficiency, we could set k = 1 to obtain an efficient SXDH-based signature with 3 group elements per signature.)
Furthermore, if we use the discrete-log-based tightly secure one-time signature scheme from [HJ12a] , then vk OTS consists of two group elements, and σ OTS consists of two exponents. Finally, we can base our double-encryption KEM on the D k -MDDH-based IND-CPA secure encryption scheme from [EHK + 13]. In that case, pk KEM consists of 2 · RE(D k ) group elements, where RE(D k ) denotes the number of group elements necessary to represent one D k -element. (For instance, for the k-Linear assumption, we have RE(D k ) = k.) C KEM consists of 2(k + 2) group elements. In the SXDH-case with k = 1, we obtain a double ElGamal KEM, which can be optimized -by reusing randomness, and using the fact that one ElGamal instance can be directly interpreted as a KEM -to pk KEM and C KEM that contain only 2 group elements each.)
In total, we thus obtain a communication complexity of 2(2k + 1 + 2) + 2 · RE(D k ) + 2(k + 2) = 2 · RE(D k ) + 6k + 10 group elements and 2 · 2 = 4 exponents under the D k -MDDH assumption. Furthermore, with the optimizations sketched above, we can get an SXDH-based construction with a communication complexity of only 2(3 + 2) + 2 + 2 = 14 group elements and 2 · 2 = 4 exponents. 
Proof of Security.
Here, t = t + t where t corresponds to the runtime required to provide A AKE with the simulated experiment as described below.
Proof. We prove the security of the proposed protocol AKE using the sequence-of-games approach, following [Sho04, BR06] . The first game is the original attack game that is played between a challenger and an attacker. We then describe a sequence of games where we modify the original game step by step. We show that the advantage of distinguishing between two successive games is negligible.
We prove Theorem 4 in two stages. First, we show that the AKE protocol is a secure authentication protocol except for probability Auth . That is, the protocol fulfills security property 1.) of the AKE security definition Definition 14. Informally, the authentication property is guaranteed by the uniqueness of the transcript and the security of the MU-EUF-CMA secure signature scheme SIG and the security of the one-time signature scheme OTSIG. We show that for any τ and any τ -accepted oracle π s i with internal state Ψ s i = accept and Pid s i = j there exists an oracle, π t j , such that π s i and π t j have matching conversations. Otherwise the attacker A has forged a signature for either SIG or OTSIG.
In the next step, we show that the session key of the AKE protocol is secure except for probability
Ind in the sense of the Property 2.) of the AKE security Definition 14. The security of the authentication protocol guarantees that there can only be passive attackers on the test oracles, so that we can conclude the security for key indistinguishability from the security of the underlying KEM. We recall that µ denotes the number of honest identities and that denotes the maximum number of protocol executions per party. In the proof of Theorem 4, we consider the following two lemmas. Lemma 3 bounds the probability Auth that an attacker breaks the authentication property of AKE and Lemma 4 bounds the probability Ind that an attacker is able to distinguish real from random keys. It holds:
AKE ≤ Auth + Ind . Game G 0 . This is the original game that is played between an attacker A and a challenger C, as described in Section 4.1. Thus we have:
Authentication
Game G 1 . In this game, the challenger proceeds exactly like in the previous game, except that we add an abort rule. Let π s i be a τ -accepted oracle with internal state Pid s i = j, where P j iŝ τ -corrupted withτ > τ . We want to ensure that the OTSIG public key vk (j) OTSIG received by π s i was output by an oracle π t j (and not generated by the attacker). Technically, we abort and raise the event abort SIG , if the following condition holds:
• there exists a τ and a τ -fresh oracle π s i with internal state Pid s i = j 6 and • π s i received a signature σ (j) that satisfies SIG.Vfy(vk (j) , vk
OTS , σ (j) ), but there exists no oracle π t j which has previously output a signature σ (j) over vk SIG , i ∈ [µ]} from the SIG challenger. It simulates the AKE challenger for A AKE as follows: It sets vk (i) as public key for user i. Every time it needs to sign a message under a long-term key it lets the SIG challenger sign that message. B SIG can answer to corrupt queries made by A AKE by just forwarding them to the SIG challenger and then forwarding the response back to A AKE . Except for this, B SIG acts exactly like the challenger in Game 0. We note that since B SIG has the power of 6 Since π s i is τ -fresh it holds that Pj isτ -corrupted, whereτ > τ .
answering to corrupt queries "on the fly", it does not need to guess which party will be corrupted by A AKE beforehand.
If event abort SIG occurs, this means that A AKE has issued a Send-query containing (σ (j) , vk
OTS ), where j is not corrupted, and (σ (j) , vk (j) OTS ) was not output by any oracle π t j . Thus, B SIG has never requested a signature for vk
OTS from its challenger. Therefore A SIG can use the signature σ (j) to break the MU-EUF-CMA Corr security of the signature scheme. This implies Pr[abort sig ] ≤ SIG .
Game G 2 . In this game, the challenger proceeds exactly like the challenger in Game 1, except that we add an abort rule. Let abort collision denote the event that two oracles, π s i and π t j , sample the same verification key, vk OTS , for the one-time signature scheme. More formally, let Proof. Note that the number of OTSIG verification keys appearing in the experiment, and thus the probability of the event abort collision , depends on A AKE . Therefore we construct an attacker B OTSIG , which runs A AKE as a subroutine by implementing the challenger for A AKE in Game 2. B OTSIG proceeds exactly like the challenger in Game 2, except that it does not generate the verification keys vk OTS used in the experiment on its own, but instead receives them from its OTSIG-challenger. With probability Pr [abort collision ] there exists (i, j) ∈ [µ · ] 2 such that vk (i) = vk (j) for i = j. If this happens, then B OTSIG issues a sign query sign(m, j) to the OTSIG challenger, who will respond with a signature σ. Then B OTSIG outputs (i, m, σ), which is a valid forgery.
Game G 3 . In this game, the challenger proceeds exactly like in the previous game, except that we add an abort rule. Let π s i be a τ -accepted oracle, for some τ , that received a one-time signature key, vk
OTS , from an uncorrupted oracle, π t j . Informally, we want to make sure that if π s i accepts then π t j has previously output the same one-time signature σ
OTS . Note that in this case π s i confirms the "view on the transcript" of π t j . Technically, we raise the event abort OTSIG and abort (and A loses), if the following condition holds:
• there exists a τ -fresh oracle π s i that has internal state Pid OTS for (m 1 , m 2 ) and accepts, but there exists no unique oracle, π t j , which has previously output (m 1 , m 2 ), σ 3. Finally, we show that any tuple (i, s, b) output by A AKE can be used to break the security of KEM. B KEM gets a set L of µ public keys, L := pk 1 1 , . . . , pk µ . It may adaptively query oracles O Encap and O Corrupt that will respond as specified in Definition 10. By L s i we will denote the set of challenge ciphertexts, corresponding to pk s i . These lists will be filled throughout the simulation.
Simulating protocol execution within the oracles. B KEM generates all system parameters and long-term keys according to the protocol specification. It passes all public parameters as well as all long-term verification keys to A AKE . In the following, on the right side, we will formally describe the simulation, whereas on the left side, we explain the changes made. The line numbering refers to the algorithms on the righthand side.
Step 1: B KEM deviates from the protocol description of Figure 1 
10: ELSE We note that C t j is a valid ciphertext. The key 11:
j is later used to respond to Test(j, t). If pk s i / ∈ L then this KEM public key is generated by the 12: m 2 := (vk t j,OTS , σ (j) , C t j ) adversary A AKE . In this case B KEM will follow the 13: σ t j,OTS ← OTS.Sign(sk t j,OTS , (m 1 , m 2 )) protocol description for Step 2. In the former case B KEM embeds a challenge in each ciphertext whereas in the latter case there is no challenge embedded in the ciphertext. We will show later that A AKE will not be allowed to issue Test(i, s) or Test(j, t) in the latter case.
Step 3: An oracle, π s i , that computes Step 3 of the protocol description receives as input the message m 2 = (vk t j,OTS , σ (j) , C s i ) and a one-time signature σ t j over (m 1 , m 2 ). We denote with C s i the KEM ciphertext that π s i receives. That is, there is probably another oracle π t j such that C t j = C s i . For the simulation of π s i , we distinguish between two cases (Line 6 ff. IF pk s i ∈ L lated a session key K t j in step two.
4:
K t j ← ∅ Otherwise B KEM does not simulate π t j ac-5: RETURN K t j and accept cording to the protocol specification. However, as above, we will show that this will not be detected.
Simulating the AKE-challenger. In this section we show how B KEM answers to the queries that are issued by A AKE .
• Corrupt(i): B KEM answers to this query exactly as in Game 2.
• RegisterCorrupt(i, pk i ) This query is also answered exactly as in Game 2.
• Reveal(i, s): If A AKE issues a Reveal()-query and oracle π s i has internal state Ψ s i = accept then B KEM needs to return the session key that is computed by π s i . We distinguish between two cases. If it holds that K s i = ∅ then there is a pair (i , s ) such that C s i ∈ L s i . This is due the simulation of Step 3 (Line 6 ) and Step 4 (Line 3). In this case B KEM issues a Corrupt(i , s )-query to the KEM challenger and receives back the secret key sk s i which it then uses to compute K s i ← KEM.Decap(sk s i , C s i ). Finally it returns K s i which is the real session key. If it holds that K s i = ∅, B KEM simply returns K s i . We note that due to the simulation of Steps 3 (Line 10), 2 (Line 10) and 4 (Line 5) this is the real session key computed by π s i .
• Test(i, s): To answer to Test()-queries, B KEM proceeds as follows. We note that this query is only allowed if π s i is fresh at the point in time when this query is issued. Due to Game 1 this means that there is a unique partner oracle π t j . By the definition of freshness, j is τ -uncorrupted. Over that, it follows from the simulation of Step 2 (Lines 7 to 9) that for the ciphertext C s i it either holds that C s i ∈ L t j or C s i ∈ L s i . We assume wlog that C s i ∈ L s i . The other case works analogously. Extracting a solution for the KEM game. Now, let (i, s, b) be the output of A AKE in Game 2. I.e., b is its guess for b s i . Then B KEM will just forward this triplet, i.e., it also outputs (i, s, b). We note that A AKE loses if there is no τ such that π s i is τ -fresh and ∞-revealed throughout Game 2. Stated differently, A AKE wins only if
• π s i hasτ -accepted,τ ≤ τ , and there is a unique partner oracle π t j such that π s i and π t j have matching conversations.
• π s i is ∞-revealed throughout the security game.
• π t j is ∞-revealed and ∞-tested throughout the security game.
• Party j isτ -corrupted whereτ > τ . We show that if A AKE wins in Game 2, then B KEM is able to win the KEM game. We distinguish between two cases. Either π s i is an initiator oracle, i.e., it computes Steps 1 and 3 of the protocol descritpion or π s i is a responder oracle, that is, it computes Steps 2 and 4 of the protcol description. Consider for the moment that π s i is an initiator oracle. This means that the KEM public key pk KEM that is used to encapsulate the session key by oracle π t j is generated by the KEM challenger, i.e., pk KEM = pk s i . Recall that to simulate π t j , A AKE issues an Encap-query KEM.Encap(pk s i ) to the KEM challenger. Let (K s i , C s i ) denote the response to this query. C s i is then sent from π t j to π s i . Recall further that to answer to a Test-query, Test(i, s), B KEM outputs the key K s i that was output by the KEM-challenger along with C s i . On the other hand, if π s i is a responder oracle then it generates a ciphertext for a KEM public key pk KEM = pk t j that was sampled by π t j and j (due to Game 1) is τ -uncorrupted. Therefore pk t j ∈ L. Recall again that to simulate π s i , B KEM issued an Encap-query KEM.Encap(pk t j ) to the KEM-challenger. Let (K s i , C s i ) denote the response to this query. Then, C s i is sent from π s i to π t j and in order to answer to a query Test(i, s) issued by A AKE , B KEM returns K s i . We note that in either case, if A AKE has advantage to win in Game 2 then the advantage of B KEM in the KEM security game is at least .
A Proof of Lemma 1
For sake of contradiction assume that there is an algorithm A such that A 1 acts as challenger for A q . We describe q +2 games and A 1 will choose which of these games is to be played. We note that A 1 may issue one proof query to a challenger C. Let π = C(·, ·, ·) denote the response and let b 1 denote the bit that was chosen by C. In game i, i ∈ [q+1] 0 , A 1 responds to the proof queries (x (j) , w 
